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The Public Policy Exception to
Employment At-Will: Time to
Retire a Noble Warrior?
by Kenneth I. Swift*
I.

INTRODUCTION

An armored car driver leaves his truck in violation of company
rules to help save a woman from a knife-wielding attacker and is
terminated.
A campus security guard is called to a scene where a man is
lifting a woman; he mistakenly believes it is an attack, arrests the
man, and is terminated.
A nurse is invited on a camping weekend by her supervisor,
refuses to take part in a bawdy dance, and is terminated.
A woman, asked by her employer to sign a statement indicating
she acted inappropriately at work, requests to meet with a lawyer
first and is terminated.1
Each of the above employees brought suit claiming they were
improperly terminated. Two prevailed; two did not. All claims were
based upon what is commonly known as the public policy exception to
the employment at-will rule.
Among the social changes brought about by the various civil rights
movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond, were numerous statutory
exceptions preventing employers from terminating or failing to hire
* Legal Writing Instructor, Hamline University School of Law. Hamline University
School of Law (J.D., 1995).
1. Each of these cases is discussed at length in Section V of this Article.
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employees based upon sex, race, age, religion, or physical disability,
among other traits.2 Alongside the development of these protections for
employees were other protections based upon the notion that an
employer should not be able to circumvent public policy by using his
otherwise unfettered right to terminate. This exception, the public
policy exception, is still commonly pleaded and litigated.
Section II of this Article will briefly review the history of employment
at-will in the United States and the emergence of the statutory
exceptions to the doctrine. Section III will provide a history of the
development of the public policy exception and explore both how the
exception was the basis for many of the statutory protections available
today for employees and how the exception significantly impacted the
employer-employee relationship. Section IV will summarize and analyze
the role that the public policy exception has played in the development
of the employer-employee relationship and will also provide the
framework for discussing whether the exception, in its present form, is
still necessary. Section V will provide an in-depth factual and legal
analysis of a sampling of public policy exception case law to explore the
malleability of the exception. Section VI, the final section of the Article,
will argue that the public policy exception in its current form has
outlived its usefulness because many of its historical uses have been
codified, leaving the exception as an unnecessary catchall provision.
II.

EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY
EXCEPTIONS

Employment at-will has been the starting point in American employeremployee relationships since at least the latter part of the nineteenth
century.4 Under this doctrine, an employer may terminate employees

2. See infra Section II.
3.

The following Westlaw ALLCASES search ["public policy" /10 "employment" & "at-

will"] returned over 1900 cases within the last ten years and over 625 within the last three
years (last searched February 18, 2010).

4. See, e.g., Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895); Henry v. Pittsburgh
& Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891); Payne v. W. & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507,
519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn.
1915). But see Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule
Revisited:A Challenge to Its Originsas Based in the Development of Advanced Capitalism,

13 HOFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 75,86 (1995) (arguing that employment at-will was prevalent
even at the early part of the nineteenth century); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The
Doubtful Provenanceof 'Wood's Rule"Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 552 (1990) (noting
that Horace Wood's statement of the employee at-will rule was based on a well-established
understanding of current labor relations).
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for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.5 The doctrine goes both
ways; an
at-will employee is free to leave a job at any time for any
6
reason.

The origin of the American at-will rule is generally attributed to an
1877 treatise by Horace Wood.7 However, there has always been great
academic debate as to whether Wood misinterpreted or misread the
prevailing English common law rule (which set employment for a fixed
term for both the employer and employee)' or whether he was reporting
on existing employment law practices prevailing in the country at the
time.'
The efficacy of the doctrine has also been debated by courts and
commentators, with many arguing that the flexibility afforded by the
doctrine benefits both employers and employees 0 and opining that
"adoption of the [at-will] rule by the courts greatly facilitated the
development of the American economy at the end of the nineteenth

5. An early, oft-quoted description of employment at-will can be found in Payne:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employes [sic] at will for good cause or for no cause, or even
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right
which an employe [sic] may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the
same cause or want of cause as the employer.
81 Tenn. at 518-19.
6. See, e.g., Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 716 (Neb. 2007) (Stephan, J.,
dissenting) (noting "an at-will employee is free to leave an employment relationship
without recourse by the employer"); McCrady v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 122 P.3d
473, 475 (Okla. 2005) (stating that an at-will employee "is free to leave his or her
employment for any reason or no reason without incurring liability to the employer");
Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 375 (Vt. 2005) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating
that an at-will employee is free to leave at any time).
7. HORAcE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (John D.
Parsons, Jr., Albany, N.Y. 1877).
8. W. Brian Hulse, Recent Developments, The Public Policy Exception to Utah's
Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 227, 229 (arguing that Wood's at-will rule
was not supported by the authorities he cited) (citing Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will
Against Wrongful Discharge:The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983)).
9. But see Clyde W. Summers, IndividualProtection Against Unjust Dismissal:Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976) (arguing that the employment at-will doctrine
emerged in the United States not as an outgrowth of English common law, but rather as
a unique development catalyzed by Wood's treatise).
10. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
982 (1984) (concluding that "[tihe flexibility afforded by the contract at will permits the
ceaseless marginal adjustments that are necessary in any ongoing productive activity
conducted ... in conditions of technological and business change"); Mayer G. Freed &
Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY
L.J. 1097, 1098 (1989) (opining that at-will employment created greater efficiency, serving
both the worker and employer).
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century."" Others have noted that it has "been applied to obtain harsh
and inequitable results." 2 Today the debate is purely academic, as
employment at-will is a strongly rooted concept in American law and the
starting point
for employer-employee relations in forty-nine" out of
14
states.
fifty
The employer-employee relationship was likely of lesser consequence
in the late 1700s and early 1800s when America had a primarily
agrarian economy. It was not until the Industrial Revolution of the mid1800s that an employee's rights to his job, or lack thereof, began to be
an issue. With the rise of large factories, employees became little more
than chattel, a fungible asset like machinery and raw goods.'" Unless

11. Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (N.C. 1989).
12. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761, 762 (Ala. 1982); see also Lawrence
E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Rafael Gely, Distilling the
Essence of Contract Terms: An Anti-Antiformalist Approach to Contract and Employment
Law, 53 FLA. L. REV. 669, 670 (2001) (arguing that employment at-will renders employees
subservient to their employers); David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and
CorporateLaw Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975,
994 (1998) (advocating the replacement of the at-will default rule with a job-security
default rule); Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment TerminationAct, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 872 (1994) (opining that employment
at-will "is a lumbering dinosaur that can no longer be rationally defended").
13. See, e.g., Harper v. Winston County, 892 So.2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004) (observing that
it is well-settled law in Alabama that employment is at-will); Hines v. Yates, 614 S.E.2d
385, 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (noting employment at-will is a well-entrenched doctrine);
Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun. Auth., 658 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1995) ("The law in Pennsylvania is abundantly clear that, as a general rule, employees are at-will . .. ."); Bennett v.
Steiner-Liff Iron & Metal Co., 826 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tenn. 1992) ("The employment at-will
doctrine has been a part of Tennessee's common-law legal tapestry for more than a
century."); Fed. Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) ("The longstanding rule in Texas provides for employment at will.... ."); Miller v. Sevamp, Inc., 362
S.E.2d 915, 919 (Va. 1987) ("The employment-at-will doctrine is a settled part of the law
of Virginia.").
14. Under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2005), an employee can only be discharged for "good cause" after a
probationary period. Id. § 39-2-904(1)(b). Good cause is defined as "reasonable job-related
grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of
the employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason." Id. § 39-2-903(5). The
presumptive probationary period is six months, although the employer may explicitly waive
or modify the period. Id. § 39-2-904(2)(b).
15. The United States Supreme Court, in a case involving the right to organize,
recognized the lack of power held by a single employee:
We said that [unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that
a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family;
that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
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a member of a union, an employee in the first half of the twentieth
century had no protection against termination.16 What the law of
employer-employee relationships did provide at that time was a central
precept of the American legal system-certainty in the law." The law
was clear that an employer could terminate any employee at any time,
for any reason, even for reasons that today are widely viewed as morally
repugnant, such as race, sex, and religion.
That all changed with the passing of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,'8 which prohibits employment decisions based upon an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 9 Over the
following decades, state legislative bodies followed suit, enacting
provisions to protect employees against similar discriminatory conduct.20

nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment;
that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with
their employer.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (citing Am. Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
16. See Stephen F. Befort, Laborand Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 354-58 (2002) (noting that the at-will
sector of employees in 1950 possessed virtually no legal protections).
17. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[Blecause we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that
he may act accordingly."); State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 21 N.W.2d 792, 795
(Minn. 1946). See generally Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the
Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) ('The more clear,
specific, and publicly knowable the law is, the more the rule of law.., is achieved. The
less clear, specific, and knowable the law is, the less secure liberty is, and the more
dependent citizens are on the benevolence and wisdom of those charged with enforcing and
interpreting the law.").
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
19. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See generally Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty:A BriefLook at
the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the DisparateImpact Theory of Discrimination,22
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431 (2005).
20. Every state has enacted some prohibitions against discrimination, grouped under
varying titles, such as human rights, civil rights, and unfair employment practices. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60
(West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-19 (LexisNexis 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330
(LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030
(2005). The exceptions noted here and throughout this Article are not meant to be an
exhaustive list, a task which would be beyond the scope of a law review article. For a more
comprehensive overview of the exceptions to the employment at-will rule, see TIMOTHY P.
GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARRNow-RIcHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE
ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS (2007).
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Further protections were developed in the years following the Civil
Rights Act, providing protection against adverse employment decisions
based upon age"' and disability,22 among many others. Recent legislation even protects against the use of genetic testing in employment decisions.' This tapestry of legislation has, while by no means eliminated
discrimination of this type, provided potential recourse against
discrimination based upon immutable human traits and sexual and
reproductive rights.24 However, even alongside the development of
these protections, courts recognized that certain terminations were
counterproductive to the broader social welfare, and with that came the
rise of the public policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment.2"

21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006). See generally
Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been,
Where It Is Today, and Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579 (1997).
22. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006). See generally
Harvey S. Mars, An Overview of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Its
Impact Upon Federal Labor Law, 12 HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 251 (1995).
23. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). See generally
Recent Legislation, Health Law-Genetics--CongressRestricts Use of Genetic Information
by Insurersand Employers, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (2009).
24. Of course, that does not mean that the law has, or even can, eliminate discrimination, particularly unsubtle and unconscious bias in the workplace. See, e.g., Kathryn
Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master's Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (arguing
that Title VII is unlikely to "actually alter the dominant norms of most workplaces or the
kinds of roles that men and women play within them"); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
StructuralTurn and the Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006)
(discussing the importance of unconscious and subtle bias); Kevin M. Clermont et al., How
Employment-DiscriminationPlaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POLY J. 547, 560-61 (2003) (noting that plaintiffs in employment discrimination
cases are less successful on average).
25. Concurrent with the development of these protections, courts started to find
"implied" contracts that limited the employer's right to terminate. These implied contracts
were primarily found in employee handbooks and similar documents provided by the
employer. This contract analysis is fimdamentally different from the exceptions described
above or the public policy exception because it is based upon the notion that the parties
have entered into a contract when the employer is receiving something of value above and
beyond the normal at-will employer-employee relationship. The majority of jurisdictions
now recognize a "handbook exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g.,
Grayson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d 1097, 1099 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Oklahoma
law); Lincoln v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 66, 67 (D. Conn. 1985); Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 733-34 (Ala. 1987); Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen.
Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska 1989); Leikvold v. Valley View Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d
170, 174 (Ariz. 1984); Crain Indus., Inc. v. Cass, 810 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Ark. 1991); Contl
Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac.
Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 115-16 (Haw. 1986); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp., Inc.,
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III. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The public policy exception holds that an at-will employee cannot be
terminated if such termination would be counter to public policy. As
discussed below, courts struggle with defining the term public policy and
determining
when a termination implicates and is contrary to public
26
policy.
Historically, the public policy exception has played a significant role
in ensuring that employees be allowed full participation and exercise of
their rights under state and federal constitutions and statutes by
prohibiting employers from terminating employees seeking to exercise
their rights. Additionally, the exception was the origin of modern
whistleblower statutes and similar protections.

A.

Protectingthe Duties and Rights of the Citizenry

One of the earliest judicial decisions limiting the power of an employer
to terminate for any reason, and perhaps the first public policy exception
case, was the case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.
In Petermann (which predates the Civil Rights Act of
196428), an employee was terminated after he refused his employer's
order to give false testimony before the California state legislature.2 9
The California Supreme Court, for the first time, noted that employment
at-will was subject to an exception for terminations in violation of public
policy.30 The court began its analysis by noting that "[tihe term 'public

720 P.2d 632, 635 (Idaho 1986); Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d
314, 318 (Ill. 1987); Hunter v. Board of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 513
(Iowa 1992); Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Ctr., 684 P.2d 1031, 1034, 1036
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Wyman v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 493 A.2d 330, 335 (Me.
1985); Staggs v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 486 A.2d 798, 801 (Md. Ct. App. 1985); Morris v.
Lutheran Med. Ctr., 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1983); Sw. Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d
261, 262 (Nev. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985);
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (N.M. 1980); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431
N.W.2d 296, 297-98 (N.D. 1988); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y.
1982); Boiling v. Clevepak Corp., 484 N.E.2d 1367, 1373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Yartzoff v.
Democrat-Herald Publ'g Co., 576 P.2d 356, 359 (Or. 1978); Small v. Springs Indus., Inc.,
357 S.E.2d 452,455 (S.C. 1987); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275,277 (S.D.
1983); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984); Ferraro v.
Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666, 671-72 (Wis. 1985).
26. See infra Sections IV and V.
27. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
29. 344 P.2d at 26.
30. Id. at 27.
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policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition."3' The court
settled on what has become a common definition of public policy: "that
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good."32 The public policy was found in state statutes making it illegal
to both give and solicit perjury.33 In holding that the termination was
unlawful, the court reasoned that the employer's generally unlimited
right to discharge employees was secondary to the importance of truthful
testimony for the public welfare. 3'
Since Petermann a myriad of statutory protections, initially fueled by
the public policy exception, have been passed to prevent dismissals of
employees when termination would do injury to the general public
welfare. Three decades later, the California Supreme Court extended
Petermann to cooperation in civil cases as well. In Gantt v. Sentry
Insurance,' the employee was the supervisor of a woman who was
being sexually harassed. The employee supported the woman's
harassment claim, both internally and in testimony to a state investigator, and was constructively terminated because of his support.36 In
holding that the public policy exception supported his claim, the court
37
addressed the issue of the difficulty in defining the term public policy.
The court ultimately determined that "[a] public policy exception

31. Id. The court further elaborated on the imprecise nature of the term public policy:
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, at page
497,236 P. 210 [at page] 212, the court stated: The question, what is public policy
in a given case, is as broad as the question of what is fraud. Also in Noble v. City
of Palo Alto, 89 Cal. App. 47, at pages 50-51, 264 P. 529, at page 530, the court
said: Public policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its
application may not be disputed. Mr. Story, in his work on Contracts (section 546),
says: It has never been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of
definition in the same manner as fraud.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Safeway Stores v.
Retail Clerks Intl Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
32. Id. (emphasis & internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Safeway, 261 P.2d at
726); see, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 n.13 (Haw. 1982);
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (Utah 1989); Rich v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 445 S.E.2d 249, 252 (W. Va. 1994).
33. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
34. Id.; accord Kistler v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (D. Kan.
1985) (noting the public policy exception protects an employee discharged for truthfully
testifying at an unemployment compensation hearing because employers cannot force
employees to opt between their jobs and perjury).
35. 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992), overruled in part by Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d
1046 (Cal. 1998).
36. Id. at 682-83.
37. Id. at 684.
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carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in
constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the proper balance among
the interests of employers, employees and the public.""
In Nees v. Hocks,39 an employee was terminated for refusing her
employer's request that she ask to be excused from jury duty.4" In
holding for the employee, the court reasoned that if an employer could
terminate with impunity an employee for serving on a jury, the moral of
the community, as demonstrated through the jury system, would be
thwarted.4 1 The right created by this decision was later codified by the
state legislature.4 2 Many other jurisdictions followed suit.43
In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.," an employee was terminated because he refused to lobby and otherwise support a bill the employer
felt would be beneficial to its business. The employee brought a claim
for wrongful discharge based upon the public policy exception grounded
in his constitutional right to free political association and beliefs.45 In
holding for the employee, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the state constitution provided the necessary
public policy, emphasizing that voting "strikes at the heart of a citizen's
social right, duties and responsibilities."46
An early and pervasive use of the public policy exception arose in
cases in which an employee was terminated for filing a workers'
compensation claim. One of the first, if not the first, of such uses can be
found in the Indiana Supreme Court case Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co.47 In Frampton an employee suffered an injury resulting in a
thirty percent permanent loss of function in her arm; however, she was
hesitant to file a claim for fear of being terminated. Nineteen months
after the injury, she received a workers' compensation settlement and

38. Id. at 688. The visual of a "tether" between public policy as delineated within
statutes or case law and the facts of any one claim is used below while analyzing the
malleability of the public policy exception. See infra Section V.
39. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
40. Id. at 513.
41. Id. at 516.
42. OR. REv. STAT. § 10.090(1) (2003) ("An employer shall not discharge or threaten to
discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of the employee's service or
scheduled service as a juror on a grand jury, trial jury or jury of inquest.").
43. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 230(a) (West 2003); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 519 (McKinney
2003); TEx. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001-003 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
44. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 896, 900.
46. Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (111. 1981)).
47. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
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In holding for the employee, the

court first noted that the purpose of workers' compensation is "to
transfer from the worker to the industry in which he is employed and

ultimately to the consuming public a greater portion of economic loss due
to industrial accidents and injuries." s The court then reasoned that
even though the at-will rule allows employers to discharge without
cause, workers' compensation itself provided a fundamental and wellstated public policy that could only be carried out by preventing
employers from terminating employees who file claims.50
Another protection for employees, which was created through the
public policy exception, was the freedom to refuse an employer's request
to commit an illegal act. In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,5 an

employee was a deckhand and was instructed by his employer to pump
the boat's bilges into the water despite a placard on the boat indicating
that doing so was illegal. The employee contacted the U.S. Coast Guard

and confirmed that the act was illegal, refused his employer's order, and
was terminated.5 2 The court held that the employee had pleaded a
cause of action under the public policy exception.53 Similarly, in

48. Id. at 426.
49. Id. at 427 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mann. v. Schnarr, 95 N.E.2d
138, 143 (Ind. 1950)).
50. Id. at 428. Many other courts followed Frampton,utilizing traditional public policy
exception analysis and vernacular. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357
(Ill. 1978); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Serv., 630 P.2d 186,
192 (Ks. Ct. App. 1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976);
Jackson v. Morris Commc'n Corp., 657 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Neb. 2003); Hansen v. Harrah's,
675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317, 1318 (N.J. 1981);
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Or. 1978). One area of disagreement
amongst jurisdictions, however, is the degree of causation required that an employee's act
of filing a workers' compensation claim had towards later termination. Some courts require
the employee to show that filing the workers' compensation claim was the "sole factor" of
their termination. See, e.g., Hansome v. Nw. Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo.
1984). Some jurisdictions require the employee to prove that the filing was a "determinative factor," which means that the employee would not have been terminated "but for" the
filing of their workers' compensation claim, and other jurisdictions use a mere "substantial
factor" test, which only requires proof that the filing the workers' compensation claim
constituted an important or significant motivating factor for the discharge. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 406 S.E.2d 358, 359-60 (S.C. 1991). But see Martin v. Tapley,
360 So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978) (refusing to recognize a public policy exception to
employment at-will involving an employee terminated for filing a workers' compensation
claim). The public policy exception may also apply for an employee who refuses to
terminate another employee who files a workers' compensation claim. See Lins v.
Children's Discovery Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 976 P.2d 168, 173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
51. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
52. Id. at 734.
53. Id. at 735.
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Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage," the employer, a salvage
company, stole items from a wreck and ordered the employee to conceal
the theft from the customer. Instead, the employee reported the theft to
the customer and was terminated.55 The employee brought a claim for
violation of the public policy exception, and the court, in reversing
summary judgment for the employer, noted that the employer's conduct
violated the state's public policy and "[any other conclusion by this court
would encourage unlawful conduct by employers and force employees to
either consent and participate in a violation of law or risk termination. " " Protection against having to commit an illegal act or be
terminated is now codified in many state whistleblower protections,
discussed below.57
B.

Whistleblower Protection

The public policy exception was also the origination point for another
high-profile statutory exception to the at-will doctrine: whistleblower
protection.5 8
In an employment context, "[wihistleblowing is an

54. 704 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
55. Id. at 1361.
56. Id. at 1362; see also Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir.
1984) (noting that an employee has a cause of action under the public policy exception
when terminated for refusing to sleep with her employer, as doing so is the equivalent of
committing prostitution, a criminal act); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331
(Cal. 1980) (ruling that an employer cannot condition employment on an employee's
participation in unlawful conduct).
57. See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
58. The term whistleblower is commonly believed to be derived from the practice of
British police (known as bobbies) blowing whistles to alert of criminal activity. See Julie
Jones, Comment, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretationof the
Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133,
1136 (2003).
In recent years the concept of a whistleblower as a hero has been pervasive in popular
culture and in movies such as A Civil Action (Wildwood Enterprises 1998), Erin
Brockovich (Universal Pictures and Columbia Pictures 2000), The Insider (Buena Vista
Pictures 1999), and Silkwood (Twentieth Century Fox 1983). Also, Coleen Rowley (F.B.I./
pre-September 11th, 2001, intelligence), Sherron Watkins (Enron), and Cynthia Cooper
(Worldcom) were declared Time magazine's persons of the year in 2002 for their
whistleblowing. Richard Lacayo and Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The
Whistleblowers, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, available at www.time.com/time/personsoftheyear/
2002. For a general overview of whistleblower protections, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan
and Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection,38 AM. BUS. L.J.
99 (2000).
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employee's disclosure of his supervisor's or employer's illegal activities
to management or law enforcement officials."59

One of the earliest judicial decisions using the public policy exception
to create whistleblower protection is the 1981 Illinois Supreme Court
decision Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co. 60 There, an employee
was terminated after alerting authorities to criminal activity by a fellow
employee and agreeing to cooperate in the investigation and testify at
trial."' In reviewing the use of the public policy exception, the court
noted that "unchecked employer power... has been seen to present a
distinct threat to the public policy carefully considered and adopted by
society as a whole. 6 2

In holding that the public policy exception

applied to provide whistleblower protection for the employee, the court
determined that public policy favored exposure of crime and that the
cooperation of citizens having knowledge of criminal activity was
essential and could not be contravened by the employer's right to
terminate at-will. 3
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many jurisdictions adopted
whistleblower protections, most often spurred on by a case involving the
public policy exception. For example, in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining
Corp.,64 an employee was terminated for refusing to dispense unleaded
gasoline into a customer's vehicle that required leaded gasoline. Doing
so would have been a violation of the law. The employee brought a
claim based upon the public policy exception, but the trial court rejected
the claim because Minnesota had yet to adopt the exception.6 5 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, noting that at least twenty-five

59. Jones, supra note 58, at 1136. Whistleblowing is distinguishable from the types of
cases discussed in the previous section when the employee was asked to commit an act that
would be a crime and was terminated for refusing to do so. See supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text. While protections for both types of activities are often included within
whistleblowing statutes, see infra note 68, whistleblowing itself refers to the reporting,
regardless of whether the employee was implicated in the actual activities.

60. 421 N.E.2d 876 (I1. 1981).
61. Id. at 877.
62. Id. at 878. As with other courts, the court acknowledged the difficulty of defining
the public policy, noting that it is the "Achilles heel" of the exception and that
[tihere is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public

policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State
collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes and, when
they are silent, in its judicial decisions.

Id.
63. Id. at 880.
64. 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), affd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
65.

Id. at 589-90.
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other jurisdictions had already adopted the public policy exception,"
and reasoning that:
Although employers generally are free to discharge at-will employees
with or without cause at any time, they are not free to require employees, on pain of losing their jobs, to commit unlawful acts or acts in
violation of a clear mandate of public policy expressed in the constitution, statutes, and regulations promulgated pursuant to statute. The
at-will employment doctrine does not depend upon the employer having
such a right."7
While the case was pending on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
the Minnesota Legislature passed a whistleblower statute. s
The adoption of whistleblower protection in various forms continued,
and today numerous state and federal statutes provide formal whistleblower protection. These statutes can most often be categorized as
"adjunct" statutes with protections included as part of a larger statutory
act.69
66. Id. at 593 n.2. One area where differing approaches exist in both statutory and
common law whistleblower protections is whether the whistleblower is to be afforded
protection if the report of improper actions is made only to the employer and not an outside
enforcement agency. In some instances, employees who only report alleged improper or
illegal activities to employers are not afforded protection under the public policy exception
if they are terminated for making those reports. Compare Riedlinger v. Hudson
Respiratory Care, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054 (N.D. 111. 2007) (noting public policy
exception does not apply to an employee who reports to company only), with Stebbings v.
Univ. of Chi., 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that reporting to
superiors as well as outside officials is protected).
67. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Boyle v.
Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
68. 1987 Minn. Laws 140, 140-41 (West) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.932 (West 2006)). The Minnesota statute, as many state statutes do, goes beyond
whistleblower activities and includes protection for employees participating in an
investigation or hearing, and protection for refusing an employer's order that the employee
commit an illegal act. MnqN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932.
69. But see False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). Under the False Claims
Act, individuals (not necessarily employees, although employees are the primary sources
of claims) are encouraged to undertake whistleblower actions by being rewarded for the
successful recovery of funds and items misappropriated from the federal government. The
individual, generally known as the relator, brings a civil action, known as a qui tam action,
in the name of the United States government. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
While the False Claims Act was actually first passed during the 1800s to help reduce
fraud during the Civil War, the act was rarely utilized prior to an amendment in 1986,
which greatly expanded the availability and amount of recovery for private plaintiffs. Pub.
L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3157-59 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)); see also Kary Klismet,
Quo Vadis, "Qui Tam"? The Future of PrivateFalse Claims Act Suits Against States After
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 87 IOWA L. REV.
283, 291-93 (2001). The use of qui tam actions rose greatly after the 1986 amendment,
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One of the first of these statues 70 protected employees who filed a
claim of unfair labor practices against an employer under the National
Labor Relations Act.71 Other federal statutory protections for whistleblowers can be found under such diverse statutory schemes as the Safe
Drinking Water Act 72 and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act. 3
In 2002 Congress passed sweeping protections for corporate whistleblowers in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.7 4 The Act provides broad protec-

from 33 claims in the 1987 fiscal year to more than 360 by the year 2000; an estimated
$4.1 billion was collected due to the claims between 1986 and 2000. Klismet, supra,at 292
(citing Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Act Legal Center: Qui Tam Statistics,
http'J/www.taf.org/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). Between 1986 and 2003, an
estimated $12 billion was collected due to qui tam claims under the federal False Claims
Act. Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Act Legal Center: Qui Tam Statistics,
http://www.taf.org/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
Prior to the 1986 amendment of the federal False Claims Act, no state had a qui tam
statute. Following the amendment, several states have enacted similar legislation. See,
e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-55 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-440 to -445
(2007); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-308.13-.21 (LexisNexis 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 1201-09 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.081-.092 (West 2005); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
175/1 to /8 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-5.5-1 to -4 (LexisNexis 2006); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:439.1-.4 (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 12, §§ 5A-O (LexisNexis
2000); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 400.610a-.610c, 611 (Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-8-401 to -412 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357.010-.250 (LexisNexis 2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 167:61-b to -e (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. §§ 27-14-1 to -15
(Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-18-101 to -108 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-181
(2004); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 36.101-.117 (Vernon 2001).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006) (establishing that employees are protected against
retaliation for making claims of unfair employer practices under the National Labor
Relations Act).
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (establishing that '[no employer
may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee"
has commenced or is about to commence proceedings connected to the drinking water
regulations or in any way participates in an investigation).
73. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-964 (2006); 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (providing protection for an
employee who "has filed or made a complaint under or related to this chapter, including
a complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the
miners at the coal or other mine of an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal
or other mine").
74. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). See generally Leonard M. Baynes, Just
Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of CorporateWhistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Sarbanes.OxleyAct, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 875 (2002); Robert G. Vaughn,
America's FirstComprehensive Statute ProtectingCorporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower ProtectionsUnder the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
A Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831 (2007).
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tion75 to any corporate employee who provides information regarding
possible fraud to Congress, any federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency, or even the employee's supervisors.7" The Act has been labeled
the "gold standard" of whistleblower protection because it includes both
criminal sanctions for the wrongdoers and monetary compensation for
the whistleblowers."
M.

PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION-WHERE HAS IT BEEN AND WHERE IS
IT GOING?

The above historical review of the development of the public policy
exception shows cases in which an undeniably clear, broad, and
necessary public good was achieved and protected through application
of the exception. It is clear that there is a public policy in favor of
participation in the judicial and electoral processes and that the public
is better off with unfettered participation in those processes. Legislatures clearly intended to ensure that workers receive care for workrelated injuries, and society benefits from ensuring that workers are not
terminated for seeking treatment. We need to protect the public from
corporate wrongdoing by encouraging those closest to the wrongdoing to
step forward. The public policy exception was instrumental in providing
the platform for these and many other protections. The exception has
been an instrument of enormous change in employer-employee law.
The public policy exception has been pleaded by employees in cases in
which public policy was not clearly implicated. However, because many
of those clearly protected public policies that were originally litigated
under the exception are now codified in whistleblower and other
statutory protections, the public policy exception has become a catchall
exception to employment at-will. As one court observed, the public
policy exception is now "intended merely to provide a modicum ofjudicial
protection for those who did not already have a means of challenging

75. The Act provides that a publicly traded company may not: "discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee." 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
76. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
77. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an EraofSelf.Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005). But see Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 65, 65 (2007) (claiming that only 3.6 percent of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers
prevailed at the initial administrative stage and 6.5 percent prevailed at the appeals
stage); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel To Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (arguing that information problems still
exist within a portion of Sarbanes-Oxley, which mitigate the effectiveness of the Act).
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their dismissals under state law."78 Further, courts have repeatedly
held that the public policy exception is not available if an aggrieved
employee has a cause of action under a statute.7 9
The issue presented now, and addressed throughout the remainder of
this Article, is whether the public policy exception continues to serve a
necessary purpose. Is the exception still necessary to protect significant
public policy? Or because of the myriad statutory exceptions to
employment at-will, are the cases applying the public policy exception
outside of those now-codified exceptions almost necessarily moving away
from protecting broader public policy interests and moving towards the
creation of a de facto "just cause" requirement for employee dismissal?
In analyzing this issue, there is a confluence of three factors:
A. The indefinable nature of the term public policy;'
B. The inherent difficulty of determining, or limiting, the length
of the "tether" between the public policy and an employee's
actions;8" and
C. The new and unique personal and professional conflicts that
will always arise with well over 100 million employees in the United
States.
To fully understand how these factors affect the application of the
public policy exception, it is necessary to take a detailed look at the
factual and legal reasoning in a variety of opinions analyzing the
exception's use in situations other than those when a clear mandate of
public policy existed and an unmistakable tie between that purpose and
dismissal could be found. The following section does so, exploring the
malleability of the exception.

78. Van Kruiningen v. Plan B, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D. Conn. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medvey v. Oxford Health Plans, 313 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99
(D. Conn. 2004)).

79. See, e.g., Mischer v. Erie Metro. Hous. Auth., 345 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (N.D. Ohio
2004) (public policy exception does not apply when statutory remedy for discrimination
claim is available); Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash.

2005) (determining that there was no public policy exception because other remedies were
available through a federal statute).
80. See infra notes 88-118, 164 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
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V. REVIEW OF CASE LAW
In his influential article on the public policy exception, Professor
Henry Perritt sets forth a four-part test to analyze the exception. 2 To
prevail under the test, the employee must prove:
1. "That a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or
in the common law (the clarity element)";'

82. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does
Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 397, 398-99 (1989). Perritt's article has
been cited in a wide variety of court opinions and other articles. See Lower v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Raymond v. U.S.A. Healthcare Ctr.
Fort Dodge, L.L.C., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1057 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Leininger v. Pioneer Natl
Latex, 875 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ohio 2007); Michael J. Phillips, Toward a Middle Way in the
PolarizedDebate over Employment at Will, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 447 (1992); S. Elizabeth
Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/PrivateDistinction:Employee Monitoring in the Workplace,
32 GA. L. REv. 825,859 (1998); Marla J. Weinstein, Comment, The Limitations of Judicial
Innovation: A Case Study of Wrongful Dismissal Litigation in Canada and the United
States, 14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 478, 495 (1993).
83. Perritt, supra note 82, at 398. See generally U.S. ex rel Sikkenga v. Regence
BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 730 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that "[a] 'clear'
public policy must be plainly defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments, (2)
constitutional standards, or (3) judicial decisions, and is 'substantial' only if it is of
'overreaching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only'") (quoting Rackley
v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 23 P.3d 1022, 1026 (Utah 2001)); Weaver v. Harpster, 885 A.2d
1073, 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 975 A.2d 555 (Pa. 2009). The court in Weaver
defined well-settled publicpolicy as follows:
It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health,
safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to
it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring.
There must be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply
integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their conviction of what
is just and right and in the interests of the public weal.
885 A.2d at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d
407, 409 (Pa. 1941)).
One area of uncertainty is whether federal law may provide the public policy for a claim
under the state's public policy exception. Most courts that have addressed the issue have
determined that federal law may provide the public policy basis. See Faulkner v. United
Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293, 297-98 (Conn. 1997) (holding federal law can serve as a source
of public policy); Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 646 (Haw. 1992) (using
the Federal Aviation Act as the source of public policy), affd, 512 U.S. 246 (1994); Wheeler
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (Ill. 1985) (finding public policy in federal
nuclear safety statutes). But see Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Wash. 2001)
(opining that the public policy exception could not be based on a federal law).
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2. "That dismissing employees under circumstances like those
involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public
policy (the jeopardy element)";'
3. "The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct related
to the public policy (the causation element)";' and
4. "The employer lacked overriding legitimate business
justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element)."s
In this Section, detailed case analysis will explore how courts have
addressed the first two parts of the test. First, courts' differing
approaches and outcomes to discerning whether a particular pronouncement of public policy can be found to support a public policy claim will
be analyzed. Second, the jeopardy element-the "tether" 7 between a
public policy and the employee's actions-will be reviewed under a
variety of factual scenarios. Finally, this Section will look at situations
when application of the public policy exception seemingly is directly at
odds with the statutory text that provides the basis for the public policy.

84. Perritt, supra note 82, at 399. See generally Jermer v. Siemens Energy &
Automation, Inc., 395 F.3d 655, 656 (6th Cir. 2005) (defining the jeopardy element as

follows: "although complaining employees do not have to be certain that the employer's
conduct is illegal or cite a particular law that the employer has broken, the employee must
at least give the employer clear notice that the employee's complaint is connected to a
governmental policy"); Hubbard v. Spokane County, 50 P.3d 602,609-10 (Wash. 2002) ("To
establish the jeopardy element, a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in particular
conduct, and the conduct directly relates to the public policy, or was necessary for the
effective enforcement of the public policy.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 384 (Wash. 1996)). In Hubbard the
Supreme Court of Washington held that whether a particular statute contains a clear
mandate of public policy is a question of law. 50 P.3d at 606.
85. Perritt, supra note 82, at 399. See generally May v. Pratt Indus., Inc., No.
1:06CV129HEA, 2008 WL 1777409, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2008) (stating that to "meet
his burden, plaintiff here must present evidence to establish an exclusive causalconnection
between his discharge and reporting violations to either his superiors or to public
authorities"); Clark v. United Emergency Servs., Inc., No. COA07-592, 2008 WL 1723229,
at *6 (N.C. App. Apr. 15, 2008) (holding there was no proof of causation when employer's
alleged act occurred seven months prior to employee's termination and no further proof of
a link).
86. Perritt, supra note 82, at 399.
87. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 688 (Cal. 1992), overruled in part by Green
v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
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A.

The Clarity Element
In Gardnerv. Loomis Armored Inc.,' the Washington Supreme Court
utilized the test in a case involving a fact pattern one would think was
conceived by a law professor. There, two armored car drivers made a
routine stop at a bank. Per company policy, one driver went in to
complete the transaction while the other driver stayed in the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, the driver in the vehicle saw the bank manager
(whom he knew) run out of the bank, screaming. Following closely
behind her was a man wielding a knife. The bank manager was able to
make it safely across the parking lot to another building, but the
attacker grabbed another woman and held the knife to her throat. The
driver got out of the armored car and, along with his fellow employee,
was able to subdue the attacker, likely saving the life of the potential
victim.8 9
The employer terminated the driver who got out of the vehicle for
failing to follow company policy.' As the court noted, this was not a
case of a persnickety employer simply enforcing a mundane rule; rather,
company history showed that armored vehicles are often robbed by
enticing the second driver to depart the vehicle and then overpowering
him, often with deadly force.9 Thus, when the employee claimed a
violation of the public policy exception, the court was faced with a
difficult legal (and moral) issue: a man was terminated from his job
because he acted heroically to save a life.92
The court wrestled with the clarity factor, as this was not a case of a
company violating a statute or requesting an employee to do so."'
Rather, this employee had been terminated for violating a company
policy that was well-grounded in both the safety of its employees and its
own financial interest. 9' In determining that the employee's termination violated the public policy exception, the court's analysis demonstrated the malleability of the exception. Beginning with the clarity element,
the employee's first proffered public policy argument focused on a
quartet of Washington state statutes that encouraged citizens to

88. 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).
89. Id. at 378-79.
90. Id. at 379.
91. Id. at 385.
92. Id. at 380-81.
93. See id. at 382-84.
94. Id. at 379 (noting that the company had a "'fundamental' company rule forbidding
armored truck drivers from leaving the truck unattended").
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cooperate with law enforcement officials. 5 The court rejected this
argument, concluding that although the statutes might create a clear
public policy, it would be an "overexpansive reading" of those statutes to
find a clear public policy supporting the employee's actions in this
case.' The court also found "weak support" for the employee's second
argument that the good samaritan law created a public policy in favor
of rendering aid to criminal victims. 97 The statute provided protections

for good samaritans but in no way required the employee to help here.9
Ultimately, the court declared that society places the highest priority
on the protection of human life and that this public policy was clearly
evidenced by countless statutes and judicial decisions." In support of
this proposition, the court cited a variety of provisions that were, at best,
loosely tied to this fundamental public policy."° The court first noted
that the Fourth Amendment's10 1 protection against warrantless
searches is waived in situations where the search is necessary to prevent
physical harm. 0 2 The court also noted that self defense is a defense
to most criminal charges." Finally, the court pointed out that it is a
complete defense to a prosecution for homicide if the actor can prove that
he or she participated in the crime under compulsion by another who
threatened death or serious bodily harm. 4 From this collection of
statutes, the court concluded there was a clear public policy, one which
was implicated by the employee's actions. ' 5
The Iowa Supreme Court, on the other hand, concluded that a general
public policy against crime and in favor of the protection of the public
was too generalized to support an argument for an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.'
An employee, a campus security
guard, received a call about an apparent altercation between a football
player and a female student. When he appeared on the scene, the
security guard saw the man holding the woman around the waist and
lifting her off the ground. The man set down the woman as ordered but
then lunged at the employee. The employee reacted by pepper-spraying

95. Id. at 381.
96. Id. at 383.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 383-84.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102. Gardner, 913 P.2d at 383-84.
103. Id. at 384.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lloyd v. Drake Univ., 686 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2004).
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the assailant and knocking him to the ground by hitting him in the
thigh with his baton. Witnesses immediately began screaming "racist,
racist." The woman and the security guard were white and the football
player was black. The case sparked controversy on the campus and
caught the attention of the NAACP and student groups. After studying
the incident, the university terminated the employee, concluding that he
had overreacted and used unnecessary force. The university also noted
that the
conduct affected its relationships with a variety of constituen7
cies.

10

The employee brought a claim for discharge in violation of public
policy, arguing that he was fired for enforcing the criminal laws of the
state.' 8 The court utilized the same Perritt elements as the court in
Gardner and focused its analysis on the first factor: whether there
existed a clearly defined public policy that protected the activity.'0 9
The employee argued that the state's criminal laws reflected a "general
public policy against crime and in favor of the protection of the
public.""0 Although agreeing with its basic premise, the court rejected
this argument, noting that "[a]ny effort to evaluate the public policy
exception with generalized concepts of fairness and justice will result in
an elimination of the at-will doctrine itself.""1
Another example of the malleability of the public policy exception can
be found in the early case of Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hospital."2 There, the employee was a hospital nurse who had
received good performance reviews and promotions during her first four
years on the job. At that time, her supervisor invited her to attend a
camping trip with hospital personnel and others in the medical
profession. During the camping trip, the supervisor and others drank
heavily and engaged in activities that are normally done in private; the
employee did not partake in these activities. On the last evening of the
camping trip, the supervisor and others performed a rendition of the
song "Moon River," which ended with the performers exposing their

107. Id. at 227-28.
108. Id. at 227.
109. See id. at 228-29.
110. Id. at 230.
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem. Inc.,
613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000)).
112. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985), supersededby statute,Arizona Employment Protection

Act, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 to -1502 (1995), as recognized by Chaboya v. Am.
Natl Red Cross, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (D.Ariz. 1999). The Arizona Employment Act
is discussed infra Section VI.
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buttocks to the audience. Again, the employee did not participate in this
performance despite the request from her supervisor to do so.' 13
When she returned to work, the employee and her supervisor had a
strained relationship, and the employee began to receive negative
feedback from her supervisor for the first time. A few months after the
camping trip, the employee was terminated. The employee sued under
a public policy exception theory, claiming she was terminated for failing
to partake in the activities on the camping trip."4 The employer was
granted summary judgment."5
The Arizona Supreme Court was faced with an employee who was
terminated from her professional job for failing to partake in what one
might reasonably conclude were boorish activities. In holding that
summary judgment was improperly granted, the court focused on the
"Moon River" performance and the employee's claim that she was
terminated for failing to participate in the criminal activity of "mooning."n 6 The court agreed, finding that exposing one's buttocks in
public was technically a violation of an Arizona statute."7 While
acknowledging the general difficulty in ascertaining clear public policy,
the court noted that nowhere is public policy more clearly stated than
with the state's criminal code. 118
The decision in Wagenseller demonstrates the limitations of the public
policy exception and the potential for arbitrary unfairness towards
employees. It is easy to speculate that a court may not have strained so
hard to find a possible violation of the public policy exception if the
group of employees had been younger or in nonprofessional vocations.
Further, and even more importantly, if the performance of "Moon River"
had ended with the performers simply exposing their underwear, even
thongs, to the audience, the public policy exception would not have
applied. Such an outcome seems at odds with the basic tenet that
everyone should be entitled to equal treatment under the law.

113. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1029.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1027.
116. Id. at 1035.
117. Id. The court did not determine that every instance of exposing one's buttocks was
necessarily a violation of the Arizona statute. Id. at 1035 n.5. The court left further
mooning cases to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id.
118. Id. at 1035.
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B.

The Jeopardy Element How Long a Tether?
In Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc.,119 an employee was issued a
reprimand by her employer, who also requested the employee sign a
document acknowledging her actions. Because the employee disagreed
with the reprimand and believed the document to be libelous, she
requested an opportunity to meet with a lawyer prior to signing and
indicated it may take her a few days to accomplish this task. She was
terminated the same day, prior to signing and prior to having an
opportunity to meet with a lawyer.'2 ° The employee brought an action
under the public 121
policy exception, claiming a general right to consult
with an attorney.
The employee pointed to numerous statutory and common law sources
for support of her proposition that Maryland public policy supported her
right to obtain advice of counsel in this situation, including a portion of
the state's constitution, which mandates access to counsel in criminal
cases and also provides access to counsel in civil cases. 1 22 The employee also cited numerous common law decisions finding a right to
counsel.'2 3 Finally, the employee cited the attorney-client privilege as
providing public policy in favor of the right to consult with an attorney.124

In rejecting her claim, the court reasoned that the employee had not
pointed to a clear mandate of public policy and that it is "wrong to
conflate any public policy generally favoring access to counsel with a
policy that is violated by the mere suggestion by an employee that he or
she may want to seek advice of counsel." 25 The court rejected the
notion that the attorney-client privilege creates a public policy in favor
of access to an attorney, noting that the attorney-client privilege
preserves the relationship once it is formed, rather than directly
fostering the formation of that relationship. 126 The court also rejected
the employee's arguments that the state constitution or state statutes
providing legal assistance to those unable to pay for services provided
public policy that supported her claim, noting the statutes only provided

119.
120.
121.

122.
123.
124.

823 A.2d 590 (Md. 2003).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 598.
Id. (citing MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXI, XXIV).
Id.
Id.

125. Id. at 606.
126. Id. at 608-09.
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equal access, which
did not equate to unrestricted legal access to all in
127
all situations.

In contrast, other courts have found a much broader right to counsel
in similar situations. A federal court held that Iowa law supports a
general right to consult with an attorney in a civil case." There, an
employee alleged that she was discharged after threatening her
employer that she would obtain a lawyer in connection with a dispute
between the parties." 9 In holding that the employee had pleaded a
cause of action under the public policy exception, the court found the
necessary clear mandate of public policy by first noting that the Iowa
Supreme Court has the inherent power to regulate the practice of
law.3 ° It then pointed to the preamble of the state's professional
responsibility code, which had been adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court,
noting that a "basic tenet of the professional responsibility of lawyers is
that every person in our society should have ready access to the
independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence."1"' The court further reasoned that public policy could only be
carried out if members of the public are able to recognize their legal
problems and are able to obtain the services of counsel. 3 2 The court
even addressed the notion that the clear mandate of public policy must
be based upon the common good rather than the need of the individual,
reasoning that "[consultation with an attorney is a necessary first step
in the process to discover whether an individual has a cognizable claim
that will vindicate the rights of all citizens, or simply a claim for a
wrong suffered by an individual."'33
A closer connection between the public policy enunciated in a statute
and the employer's actions was required in Shero v. Grand Savings
Bank. "s4 There, an employee was named in a lawsuit brought against
the employer by one of its customers, a city. The employee filed a
counterclaim against the city seeking certain records and information
under the state's open records law. The employer requested that the

127. Id. at 608.
128. Thompto v. Coborn's, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097, 1129 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
129. Id. at 1103.
130. Id. at 1119.
131.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

132. Id.
133. Id. at 1120; see also Simonelli v. Anderson Concrete Co., 650 N.E.2d 488, 492
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "the act of firing an employee for consulting an attorney
could serve as the basis for a public policy exception to the common-law employment-at-will
doctrine").
134. 161 P.3d 298 (Okla. 2007).
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employee drop his counterclaim and, when he refused, terminated
him. 3 ' In dismissing the employee's claim under the public policy
exception, the court noted that the open records law set forth a clear
public policy concerning people's right to be fully informed about their
government, but the court determined that the law itself was silent as
to "any public policy against conditioning continued employment on the
abandonment of claims pursuant to the [law]."' 36
Similarly, a short tether was used in Imes v. City of Asheville, 3 7 in
which an employee had worked for twenty-seven years as a bus driver.
The employee was shot and seriously injured by his wife in a domestic
dispute and was terminated.1 38 In his complaint, taken as true by the
court in the context of the employer's motion to dismiss, the employee
alleged the employer had "informed him he was being terminated due to
the [pilaintiff being a victim of domestic violence.
The employee argued that his termination violated the public policy
exception on the basis that "domestic violence is a serious social
problem" and that terminating someone "based on [his or her] status as
a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public." 4 '
The plaintiff pointed to state statutes prohibiting domestic violence as
a source for the public policy.' 4' In rejecting the employee's claim, the
court recognized that domestic violence was a serious social problem but
noted that all statutes designed to combat social ills such as drug abuse
and child abuse "may be read to express a general public policy in favor
of protection of victims" of social ills; but such a reading did not create
special employment protections.'
Protections under the public policy
exception, the court noted, were to be narrowly construed to prevent
status-based discrimination and to aid enforcement of the law."3

135. Id. at 299. The employee was ultimately successful in his counterclaim against
the city. Id.
136. Id. at 301; see also Goggins v. Rogers Meml Hosp. Inc., 683 N.W.2d 510,514, 517
(Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasizing the "limited scope of the exception" when the employee
was not faced with a "report and be terminated" situation).
137. 594 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
138. Id. at 398. The employee was shot on July 12 and was terminated on August 17.
Id. It is unclear from the opinion whether the employee had returned to work at the time;
but, there is no mention in the opinion that if the employee had not yet returned to work,
he would not be able to return. See id.
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 399-400.
143. Id. at 400; see also Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
In Borden the court held there was no public policy exception for termination due to
pregnancy, reasoning that:
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C. The Public Policy Exception v. Statutory Language
The malleability of the public policy exception, and how two different
courts can issue well-reasoned but diametrically opposed decisions under
the public policy exception, can be seen in a line of cases involving a
similar fact pattern: An employee believes he or she has been discriminated against but is barred from bringing a discrimination claim because
the state discrimination statute requires an employer to employ a
minimum amount of employees before the discrimination statute will
apply. Instead, the employee brings a claim under the public policy
exception based upon the public policy enunciated in the discrimination
statute. Jurisdictions reach opposite conclusions, neither of which can
be considered an impermissible reading of the public policy exception,
which demonstrates the malleability of the exception.
In Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,'" an employee
claimed she was terminated from her job as a bookkeeper with an
architectural firm due to missing work for pregnancy-related medical
visits. If the employee's allegations were true, the termination would
have violated the state's anti-discrimination statute. 145 However, the
employee was unable to bring a claim under the statute because the
employer only had two employees, and the statute only applied to
employers with three or more employees.'46 The employee brought a
claim under the public policy exception, relying 14upon
the discrimination
7
statute as a source of enunciated public policy.

The court did not dispute the notion that the statute enunciated public
policy against discrimination in the workplace. 4 ' However, the court
also determined that the statute's provision limiting the application of
the statute to employers with three or more employees also enunciated
a public policy--one the court could not overlook. 149 While the court

The courts of this state have consistently held that they will not usurp the
legislative function and, under the rubric that they are the propounders of "public
policy," undertake to create exceptions to the legal proposition that there can be
no recovery in tort for the alleged "wrongful" termination of the employment of an
at-will employee.
395 S.E.2d at 629.
144. 802 A.2d 731 (Conn. 2002).
145. Id. at 734, 738-39.
146. Id. at 733.
147. Id. at 734.
148. Id. at 740.
149. Id. at 741. In Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223 (Okla. 1995), overruled in part by
Smith v. Pioneer Masonry, Inc., No. 105285, 2009 WL 3748510 (Okla. Nov. 10, 2009), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court set forth the basic analytical structure followed by most courts
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noted that the statute itself did not provide legislative history as to why
the statute applied to employers with three or more employees, the court
surmised that the legislature "did not wish to subject this state's
smallest employers to the significant burdens, financial and otherwise,
associated with the defense of employment discrimination claims," and
wanted to protect the intimate and personal relationships that exist in
very small businesses.5 0
A different outcome was reached by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Weaver v. Harpster'5 ' when an employee alleged that she was
continually sexually harassed by her employer to the point that she
resigned because of the intolerable work conditions. Following a
required procedure for a sexual harassment claim, the employee
requested that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
investigate her claim. But because Pennsylvania law limited sexual
harassment claims to employers with four or more employees and
because the employer had fewer than four, her claim was rejected.5 2
The employee commenced a claim for wrongful discharge based upon
the public policy exception.'5 3 In concluding that the employee had a
valid claim under the public policy exception, the court first determined
that there was a well-established policy set forth in the state statutes." It then determined that the statute did not provide relief for
the victim in this case and that failure to provide her with a remedy

that hold a public policy exception is not allowed:
The body of our common law, which serves to supplement the corpus of statutory
enactments, is powerless to abrogate the latter, either in whole or in part. Validly
expressed legislative will must always control over contrary notions of the
unwritten law. When in pari materia,statutory law and the precepts of either preexisting or after-declared common law are to be construed together as one
consistent and harmonious whole. Once an interaction of the two sources has
been measured by these principles, it is clear that... [the plaintiff's] common-law
claim [is] not actionable as a discharge in breach of public policy because her
employer, who engaged fewer than [the statutorily specified number of] employees,
is outside the [a]ct's purview.
905 P.2d at 228-29 (emphasis omitted).
150. Thibodeau, 802 A.2d at 740-41. In reaching these assumptions, the court noted
that its determination of the legislature's intent was consistent with federal decisions
construing Congress's intent when Congress included an employee minimum in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); Thibodeau, 802 A.2d
at 741 (citing Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995)).
151. 885 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 975 A.2d 555 (Pa. 2009).
152. Id. at 1074.
153. Id. at 1075.
154. Id. at 1076-77. For the court's explicit definition of the exception, see supra note
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would abridge that public policy. 55 The court dismissed the employer's argument that providing a cause of action for sexual discrimination
here would contravene the legislature's intent to limit claims to
employers with four or more employees by labeling such an outcome as
both "quixotic" and "arbitrary." 6' The court further justified its
opinion by differentiating public policy in the view of the legislature
versus public policy in the view of the court:
Public policy, in the administration of the law by the courts, is
essentially different from what may be public policy in the view of the
legislature. With the legislature, it may be and often is, nothing more
than expediency. The public policy which dictates the enactment of a
law is determined by the wisdom of the legislature. Public policy...
with [the legislature] ... may be and often is, nothing more than

expediency; but with [the courts], it must, and may only be a reliance
upon consistency with sound policy and good morals as to the
consideration or the thing to be done. 5 '

155. Weaver, 885 A.2d at 1077.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1078 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Mamlin, 17 A.2d at 409); see also Molesworth v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608, 612 (Md. 1996)
(allowing a discrimination claim based upon the public policy exception and reasoning that
the exemption for small employers merely excludes small businesses from the administrative process of the state's antidiscrimination act but not from the public policy enunciated
in the act); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ohio 1995) (finding the necessary
public policy to support the employee's termination claim in statutes prohibiting sexual
imposition and prostitution).
As this Article was going to press, two state supreme courts rendered decisions that set
forth diametrically opposed analyses in their majority opinions. First the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, overturned the superior court's decision in Weaver,
holding that there was no public policy to support the employee's exception to the at-will
rule. Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A-2d 555, 556-57 (Pa. 2009). Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first determined that the statute in question announced a broad policy
against discrimination applicable to "all individuals." Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the court also determined that the legislature had specifically
exempted, for "[w]hatever the reason," employers with four or fewer employees from the
statute; therefore, there was no public policy to support the employee's claim. Id. at 569.
The vehement dissent begins as the majority opinion did, asserting that the statute
provides a clear mandate against discrimination. Id. at 574 (Todd, J., dissenting). The
dissent further argued that the exemption for small employers was only intended to relieve
such employers of the administrative and economic burdens under the statute, including
the "specter" of a complaint brought by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.
Id. at 575. The dissent reasoned that "(wihile subjecting only larger employers to such
burdens may be sound policy, it does not follow that, in doing so, the [gleneral [aissembly
intended to permit smaller employers" to discriminate. Id.
Interestingly, the dissent's reasoning was precisely the reasoning that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court used in holding exactly opposite of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; the
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Similarly, while most courts have held that the public policy exception
does not apply if a statutory scheme provides a remedy," 8 in Bukta v.
J.C. Penney Co., 6 9 the court allowed the public policy exception to
provide an expansion of statutorily allowed remedies."6 An employee
brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)"6 ' and
Ohio discrimination statutes, both of which provided a remedy for the
employee's wrongful discharge allegation.1 62 Noting that the Ohio
Supreme Court had not yet provided "remedies broad enough to fully
compensate an aggrieved employee for an employer's violation of those
statutes," the court allowed the employee's public policy exception claim,
based upon the ADA and the Ohio statute, to survive summary
judgment."
VI.

ANALYSIS

The public policy exception, in its current application, has outlived the
purpose for which it was developed. The exception was created at a time
when courts recognized that the only way broad public policy could be
adequately implemented was by preventing employers from terminating
employees who committed, or refused to commit, certain acts. Unless an
employee refused to dump toxic sludge in a river, or at least informed
the authorities of the dumping, the public was unlikely to know. Unless
an employee refused to alter financial documents, or alert the authorities

Oklahoma court overturned its own prior decision which had held that the public policy
exception could be not used as the basis for a common law discrimination claim when the
employer employed less than the required number of individuals to be subjected to the
state statute. Smith v. Pioneer Masonry, Inc., No. 64 105285, 2009 WL 3748510 (Okla.
Nov. 10 2009). In Smith the employee had been denied the right to bring a racial
discrimination claim against his employer at the trial court and court of appeals because
the employer had fewer than the statutory minimum fifteen employees. Id. at *1. In
reversing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted: "In reaching this conclusion, we do not
disturb Brown's holding that the Legislature may validly excuse 'small shops' from
statutory remedies. However, this exclusion does not affect the right of employees in 'small
shops' to pursue the common law remedy ofa... tort for the discharge based on prohibited
discrimination." Id. at *3.
This decision fully illuminates the malleability of the term public policy. Each opinion
is eminently reasonable in its interpretation of the public policy that emanates from the
statute. This malleability is the focal point of the discussion regarding the future of the
public policy exception, infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
159. 359 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
160. Id. at 673-74.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (2006).
162. Bukta, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
163. Id. at 674.
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of the alterations, the public was not going to be protected against
financial fraud. Today, those needs have been met in a variety of
legislative acts. What we are left with is a catchall exception that is
simply too malleable in its application to provide the necessary guidance
for courts and citizens required by any law. The term public policy is
too vague 1 6 -- and the maximum tether between public policy and an
employer's actions is too difficult to determine-to provide a discernible
and fair law to govern the relations between employers and employees
and, perhaps even more importantly, between employees.
As the court in Weaver v. Harpster'65 outlined above, the public
policy functions of a court and legislature are vastly different. In
analyzing the issue of fairness in the context of the public policy
exception today, one is faced with the fundamental dichotomy between
the legislative and judicial lawmaking functions: the legislative function
requires looking first and foremost at the macro concept of fairness-what is best for society as a whole-while the judicial function
must focus more squarely on the micro concept of fairness-what is best
for the litigants before the court. Courts, at their core, are deciding the
fate of an individual in a particular case. While it may be unfair on a
micro level for an individual to be terminated because she refused to
participate in a "Moon River" skit with her boss, it is unfair on a macro
level for this one employee to be provided protection under the law when
other employees who have personality-based clashes with their
supervisors are not.
What employment at-will does is provide fairness at a macro level: all
employees run the risk of being treated unfairly by their employers.
While terminations that can objectively be categorized as unfair will
occur under the at-will system, as Richard Epstein pointed out in his
1984 article, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 6' employers will face
reputational losses if they terminate employees for a bad or no reason. 67 This reputational factor, Epstein advances, works both negatively-employers acting arbitrarily will be less desirable for good
employees-and positively-employers with good reputations will attract
good employees.'
The validity of Epstein's analysis has increased

164. See Noble v. City of Palo Alto, 264 P. 529, 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) ("Public
policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which its application may not be
disputed."), cited in Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So. 2d 1050, 1052-53 (Ala. 1990) (quoting
the definition and concluding that the term public policy is too vague to adopt the public
policy exception to employment at-will).
165. 885 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2005), reu'd, 975 A-2d 555 (Pa. 2009).
166. 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
167. Id. at 967-68.

168. Id.
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exponentially over the last twenty-five years due to the availability of
information over the Internet.
Lawmakers have recognized employment at-will as the law by carving
out exceptions to the rule while leaving it intact. Continued use of the
public policy exception threatens to envelop the rule.
While an
argument can be made against employment at-will, such a determination
should be left to a legislative body rather than the ad hoc approach that
the current public policy exception allows, even demands.
The best approach at this time would be for individual state legislatures to step forward and fully codify employment at-will and limit the
scope of the public policy exception. A template for doing so can be
found in Arizona statutes,169 modified in the proposed four-step
solution below:
Part 1: Declare that the at-will relationship is the policy of the
70
state.
One unique aspect of the employer-employee relationship law is that
while state and federal legislative bodies have carved out numerous,
detailed statutory exceptions to the at-will rule, the basic rules still
remain a common law creation.1 7 ' This is no doubt a result of both an
intentional approval of the at-will rule by legislative bodies, and the fact
that each heretofore passed legislation is merely an exception to this rule
and, therefore, inappropriate to address the general employment law.
However, to limit the application of the public policy exception, the
legislative body must first set forth the at-will rule as the basic law in
the jurisdiction and then set forth the applicable exceptions to that basic
rule. Otherwise, if the at-will rule remains a judicially created rule,
courts will rightfully determine
that they have the power to create
1 72
exceptions to that basic rule.

169. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 23-1501 (1995).

170. See id. § 23-1501(2) ("The employment relationship is severable at the pleasure
of either the employee or the employer .... ."). This section of the statute goes on to set
forth an exception for written contracts, both those intentionally created by the employer
or employee and contracts created through employee handbooks. Id.
171. Normally, when a legislative body decides to address an area of the common law,
the legislative body codifies all major components-for example, the Federal Rules of

Evidence.
172. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (noting that
"[a]lthough the [liegislature has created those exceptions to the [employment-at-will]
doctrine, this court is free to judicially amend a judicially created doctrine").
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Part 2: Set Forth the Exceptions
As various exceptions to the employment-at-will rule have developed,
the exceptions themselves, as well as remedies, have been included in
the statutory text. A statutory scheme could rely upon those sections
individually with solely a general reference to statutory text; however,
a better approach would be to specifically reference each statutorily
created exception to the at-will rule. 173 For example:
All employment is presumed to be at-will, and an employee shall
have no right to sue for damages for wrongful termination unless:
(1) There exists a written employment contract
between the employer and employee; or
(2) Termination would be in violation of a state
statute: anti-discrimination; workers' compensation;
whistleblower;jury duty, and so on.
The listings would continue with all statutory exceptions. Certainly
a catchall exception could be referenced at the end, but a comprehensive
listing would not only provide employers and employees with a direct
reference, but also alert lawmakers to consider employment implications
of any future statutory schemes. The proposed statute would conclude
with the public policy exception in the following paragraph.
Part 3: Limit the Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception should not be wholly discarded, but its use
should be limited to direct violations of state statutory law-a very short
tether. The exception is still necessary to protect against egregious
action when employers terminate an employee who has refused to violate
state statute. Example language, building upon the scheme set forth
above, could read as follows:
The employee refuses to commit an act or omission which would
directly violate the state constitution or state statute. To prove a
claim of wrongful termination under this section, the employee must
prove by a preponderanceof the evidence that:
The act or omission would have directly violated the
state constitution or state statute, and the terminationwas
directly caused by the refusal to act or omit.

173. This is the approach generally followed by Arizona in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501.
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A related issue is whether an employee's good faith belief that an act
or omission would violate the state laws should suffice to provide a basis
for the claim.174 While there is some merit to this notion, the goal in
the revamped public policy exception should be clarity and certainty for
all parties, which can only be achieved through reliance upon the direct
statutory text.
Part 4: Damages
An employee's claim for violation of the public policy exception should
be heard in tort, rather than contract. Damage awards calculated on a
breach of contract basis' 75 limit the employee to lost wages and
benefits. The problem with calculating damages solely based upon a
contractual relationship between the employer and employee is that it
puts lower-paid employees at a significant disadvantage. First, lowerwage positions are generally more abundant and available, both in sheer
number of positions and in the lower qualifications necessary to earn the
position. This means that such employees are likely to have much lower
damage totals, and therefore, employers are less cautious when
terminating those employees, even in violation of a statute. Further,
simply being awarded lost wages does not adequately compensate the
employee who has been forced to leave coworkers and may have
hardships related to transportation and scheduling. Second, because of
the lower damage potential, obtaining counsel to pursue a claim against
an employer would be extremely difficult. An employee earning $2000
to $3000 per month would need to be out of work a significant period of
time before hiring an attorney would make financial sense.
With the clarity afforded by the above statutory approach to the public
policy exception, employees should be entitled to greater potential
damage awards against employers who violate the public policy
exception. Beyond lost wages, employees should be entitled to a form of
"pain and suffering" damages related to the reasonable and customary
implications of losing a job, such as mental pain and anguish, expenses
related to a job search, and any resulting inconvenience to the employee's lifestyle. Inconveniences include changes in location, transportation,
and work hours, and the resulting changes in personal life and child
care.
Additionally, there should be access to punitive damages for employers
who act in reckless disregard of the employee's rights, which would

174. See, e.g., Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 775 (N.H. 2002) (noting a public
policy exception based upon "good faith" reporting of a perceived employer violation of a
wiretapping and eavesdropping statute).
175. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983).
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require proof that the employer either knew that its actions violated the
law and proceeded to act in violation of the law, or the employer failed
to take reasonable steps to become knowledgeable of the law. Providing
access to greater potential awards should provide greater protection for
lower-paid employees.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The public policy exception to employment at-will had a pronounced
and important impact on shaping the employer-employee relationship
from the 1970s through the 1990s. Its use led to important statutory
protections, which today safeguard public policy and discourage
corporate wrongdoing. However, the exception should now be curtailed
because its current application threatens to engulf the at-will employment rule.

